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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RAY PLEDGER,

)
)
Plaintiff/Appellant,
)
)
vs
)
)
s. TONY cox,
)
)
Defendant/Respondent. )

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
ON APPEAL
Case

~o.

16987

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This proceeding involves a claim by appellant that
the trial court, in a de novo hearing on a driver's license
revocation under the implied consent law, erred in a ruling
against appellant based on appellant's failure to support its
position by evidence.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable Maurice D. Jones found that appellant
had refused to submit to a breathalyzer test as required by law
and that appellant-plainitiff had not met its burden of proof as
party seeking relief in a civil action.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks remand and a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was arrested for driving under the influence
of alcohol on September 2, 1979.

When requested to take the

breathalyzer test by the arresting officer, appellant refused.
Pursuant to statutory law requiring the revocation of the license
of a driver who refuses to submit to a chemical test, appellant's
driver's license was revoked after a hearing on the matter on
the 31st day of October, 1979.
Appellant filed a petition for a de novo review of the
matter in District Court for the Third Judicial District- for
Salt Lake County.

Hearing was held on February 26, 1980.

After hearing testimony and evidence presented, the trial court
judge determined that appellant's burden of proof as plaintiff
and moving party in the civil action was not met and that
appellant-plaintiff had not sustained its position.

(T. at 15, 16.)

The trial judge then ruled that, as determined in the departmental
hearing, appellant's driver's license should be revoked for one
year.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT PRODUCED NO EVIDENCE AT
THE TRIAL DE NOVO TO SHOW A LACK
OF ANY OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
FOR A REVOCATION UNDER SECTION 416-44JO, U.C.A. 1953, AS AMENDED
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A cursory reading of the transcript of the trial below
will show obviously and clearly that the appellant had an
opportunity to present his case and evidence of the merits and
simply failed to prove his allegations.
A.

BOTH IN THE DEPARTMENTAL HEARING AND DE
NOVO REVIEW A PRIMA FACIE CASE WAS
ESTABLISHED BY THE DEFENDANT DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SAFETY.

Under authority of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10, 1953,
as amended, the Department of Public Safety, Drivers' License
Division is obligated to revoke the license of any person who:
1)

"has been placed under arrest" where the arresting officer

"had grounds to believe the arrested person had been driving or
was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol," and 2) "has thereafter been requested by
a police officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests
provided for,"

3) has "refused to submit to such test or tests,"

4) "was warned by a police officer .•. that a refusal to submit
to the test or tests can result in revocation of his license,"
and who 5)

did not "immediately request the chemical test."

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.lO(b), 1953, as amended.
The transcript of the trial evidence shows:

1)

That

appellant was placed under arrest (T. at 30) and that the arresting
officer, on the basis of appellant's statement that he had "hit"
a car (T. at 31), and on the basis of appellant's unsteadiness
(T. at 33), odor of alcohol (T. at 33), and performance on the
field sobriety tests (T. at 33), had grounds to believe appellant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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had been driving while under the influence of alcohol; 2)

that

appellant was requested to take a breathalyzer test (T. at 30);
3) that he refused (T. at 30, 33); 4)

that he was warned of the

consequences of his refusal (T. at 34); and 5)

that appellant

failed to request the test after this warning (T. at 34).
B.

THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE PRODUCED BY PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT WHICH SHOWED OR TENDED TO SHOW A
LACK OF ANY OF THE FOREGOING ELEMENTS.

The function of the trial judge is to weigh evidence.
His determination should not be overturned unless it does violence
to the facts.

In the present case, in light of the lack of evidence

to controvert the appellee-defendant' s prima facie case, the judge
could not have ruled other than. he did, and therefore should not
be overturned.
While the plaintiff in a de novo refusal hearing is not
required to overcome the entire weight of the original administrative decision, it still must produce evidence which conflicts with
any prima facie evidence of the essential elements.
POINT II
IN A CIVIL ACTION THE BURDEN OF PROOF
IS ON THE PETITIONER TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE
AND PERSUADE THE TRIER OF FACT OF THE
ALLEGATIONS THE PETITIONER MAKES.
Appellant set out in its complaint and petition to the
district court an allegation challenging the arresting officer's
"probable cause" to make the arrest for driving under the influence
of alcohol.
It is clearly Utah law that implied consent

trial~ n~
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novo are civil proceedings.

See the case of Ballard v. State

Motor Vehicle Division, 595 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1974) and all of the
subsequent cases on point.

Therefore, the basic civil rules of

procedure and evidence were probably used by the trial court.
The trial court was fully aware of the court's opinions and
decisions in these obvious kinds of cases and therefore did not
apply the more rigorous requirements of a criminal case as was
urged by the petitioner, yet he gave the petitioner a full
opportunity to present evidence.
Under elementary Utah law, Koesling v. Basamakis,
539 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1975), the proponent of a proposition must
bear both the burden of producing evidence in support of that
proposition, and the burden of persuading the trier of fact by
a preponderance of the evidence as to that proposition.

The

appellant in this case cannot expect to make a general allegation
and provide no support in evidence especially when his own
evidence establishes the opposite claim of the defendant.
In a de novo hearing subsequent to an administrative
"Implied Consent" Revocation Hearing, the burden of proceeding
with the evidence and persuading by a preponderance of the
evidence should be on the motorist-licensee.

In Heer v. Department

of Motor Vehicles, 450 P.2d 533 (Oregon 1969), the Oregon Supreme
Court ruled on

the issue of burden of proof in a de novo hearing.

The case involved an appeal from a de novo proceeding on the
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Motor Vehicle Department's suspension of the petitioner's license
for refusing to submit to a chemical test under the implied consent
laws.

The petitioner alleged that i t was a gross abuse of

discretion "to require the petitioner to proceed first in the trial
de novo when the reverse was their position in the administrative
hearing."

The court noted:
The same complaint was made by the
petitioner in Lira v. Billings and
the Kansas Supreme Court held the
statute there, procedurally identical
with the Oregon statute, requires the
petitioner, as the one seeking affirmative relief, to carry the burden of
proof. We agree with this analysis,
and it follows that if petitioner has
the burden he must initiate the
evidence. Buda v. Fulton, 157 N.W.2d
336 (Iowa 1968):
The questions which have been raised
by_ the petitioners, as shown by the
foregoing discussion, all have been
raised and disposed of in uniform holdings
of the supreme courts of other states
having statutes almost identical with the
Implied Consent Law in Oregon. We agree
with the results in those cases.

Id at 537.

This same issue was again before the Oregon Supreme

Court in Burbage v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 450 P.2d 775
(Oregon 1969) and the court referred to its earlier discussion
in Heer v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, supra, and then went on to
discuss the issue at more length:
The trial court instructed the jury that
the Department of Motor Vehicles had the
burden of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence and that the verdict must be by
at least 10 to 2 majority. Petitioner
claims that he was entitled to an instruction that the burden of the Department
was to prove its case beyond a reasonable
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
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The Department claims that the court erred
in putting any burden of proof upon the
Department because the burden was upon the
petitioner; that the quantum of proof was
by a preponderance of the evidence; and
that the verdict should be the same as in
civil cases--that is, not less than a 9 to
3 majority.
[3] In Heer; Grayson, supra, the first
case to come before this court involving
the Oregon Implied Consent Law, the circ~it judge required the petitioners to go
forward with the evidence. We affirmed
that as the correct procedure and held
that the burden of proof is upon the
petitioner, citing Lira v. Billings, 196
Kan. 726, 414 P.2d 13 (1966), and Buda
v. Fulton, 157 N.W.2d 336 (Iowa 1968).
The latter case held that the trial judge
in an implied consent law appeal de novo
to the court was in error in holding that
the burden of proof was upon the department.
The Iowa court discussed the meaning of "de
novo" in this context, said that the
petitioner was the one taking the aj?peal,
that as· the appellant he necessarily made
the affirmative allegations, and that the
burden of oroof follows the Pleading.
In
this connection the Iowa Supreme Court cited
our opinions in Burkholder v. S.I.A.C., 242
Or. 276, 281, 282, 409 P.2d 342 (1965), and
Dimitroff v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 209 Or.
316, 321, 322, 306 P.2d 398 (1957). A
review of these Oregon cases indicates that
the compensation act governing the procedure
there specifically placed the burden of proof
on the party appealing from the administrative
ruling. Unfortunately, the statute does not
explicitly allocate the burden in this case.
Nevertheless, the more logical and workable
rule, as we held in Heer; Grayson, supra, is
that the petitioner who makes the affirmative
allegations has the burden of proving them and
must initiate the evidence. ORS 172.250(5).
[4]
Buda v. Fulton, supra, as already noted,
holds that the quantum of evidence necessary to
carry the burden of proof in a case of this
nature is a preponderance of evidence.
(Emphasis
added.)
Id at 777-778.
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It should be noted that the Oregon Supreme Court has
construed its provision for review of implied consent refusal
hearings in the same manner as Utah has construed its provision.
In fact, the Oregon

court notes this, citing McAnerney v. State

Dept. of Public Safety, 9 Utah 2d 191, 194, 341 P.2d 212, 214
(1959) in its opinion in Stehle v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles,
368 P.2d 386, 390 (Oregon 1962).

It construes its statute as

requiring an independent determination, in a trial de novo, in
the same sense as the Utah Supreme Court has in McAnerney.

This

adds a great deal of persuasiveness to the argument that Utah
should resolve the burden of proof question along the lines of
the Oregon rationale in Heer and Burbage.
The two cases cited by the Oregon court, Lira v. Billings,
196 Kan. 726, 414 P.2d 13 (1966) and Buda v. Fulton, 157 N.W.
2d 336 (Iowa 1968), directly addressed the burden of proof issue.
The Kansas Supreme Court in Lira stated:
We further hold that K.S.A. 8-259(a) requires
a trial de novo of the particular question at
issue, governed by the rules applicable to
civil proceedings in the district court, with
the burden of proof on petitioner as the one
seeking affirmative relief.
(Emphasis added.)
Id at 18.

The Iowa Supreme Court held that since a licensee's

statutory appeal from ad administrative hearing is heard de novo,
with the right to present evidence as in an ordinary action
commenced originally in the district court, the burden of proof is
on the plaintiff licensee.

Buda v. Fulton, supra, at 338-339.

Faced with this same issue, the Nebraska Supreme Court
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c:.hat:

The rationale of the Iowa court set forth
in Buda v. Fulton, supra, is persuasive and
we refer the reader to that opinion. We
hold that en appeal to the District Court .•.
from an order of the Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles ..• revoking a motor
vehicle operator's license, the burden of
proof is on the licensee to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence the ground
for reversal.
MacKey v. Director of Dept. ·of Motor Vehicles, 194 Neb. 707,
235 N.W. 2d 394, at 397 (1975).
A later Oregon case applied the law cited above in a
fact situation similar to the present case in that appellant
alleged a lack of. reasonable grounds for his arrest.

The court

held that "on appeal to the circuit court, petitioner had the
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his
license was wrongfully suspended, i.e., that one of the elements
..• was not present. 11

Nordquist v. Department of Motor Vehicles,

552 P.2d 873, 874 (Oregon App. 1976).

(Emphasis added.)

Other courts have ruled that the burden of proof on
appeal or in a de novo hearing from a drivers license revocation
is on the licensee.

Lutjemeyer v. Dennis, 186 Neb. 46, 180 N.W.

2d 679 {1970); Hoban v. Rice, 22 Ohio App. 2d 130, 259 N.E.2d
136 {1970).

In addition, courts in several states have addressed

the burden of proof issue making it depend on the specific
allegations made by licensees:

no refusal because of confusion

over Miranda warning; State v. Severino, 537 P.2d 1187 (Hawaii 1975);
Strand v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 8 Wash. App. 877, 509
P.2d 999 (1973); Barton v. Director of Dept. of Motor Vehicles,
l~

--- -- -- ..... 863 (1975); authorization of particular
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test by implied consent laws; Meyer v. Dept. of Public Safety
License Control, Etc., 312 So. 2d 289 (La. 1975).

All of these

courts have held the burden of proof as to these allegations to
be on the petitioner.
POINT III
APPELLANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY
ANY OF THE PROCEDURES IN THE
TRIAL COURT.
Assuming, arguendo, that the district court committed
error of some type, appellant must show that such error was
prejudicial and not harmless.
Appellant has asked for remand and a new de novo refusal
hearing.

Having failed to move for a new trial under Rule 59,

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the appellant should not be
rewarded for such failure by being allowed a new trial under
requirements not set out in Rules 59(a) and 61, and by this Court's
decisions applying those rules.
CONCLUSION
According to Utah law, the burden of proof is on the
party pleading or alleging a proposition.

The Utah Supreme Court

may not have directly ruled on the specific procedure and rule
of evidence in a de novo review of a driver's license refusal
hearing under implied consent law, as provided for by statute,
however, courts of several other states have ruled on this issue
-10-
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and as a whole found the burden of proof consistently on the
petitioner, as is the usual rule in all civil proceedings.

Courts

in these states, many of which have implied consent statutes very
similar to Utah's (e.g. Oregon and Kansas), apply the basic rule
that the moving party has the burden of production and persuasion,
Koesling v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1975), to de novo
proceedings.
The discretion of the trial court should not be
overturned unless it is prejudicial.

Appellant supplied no

evidence to upset the prima facie evidence of the appellee nor
has it alleged any prejudice on appeal.

Appellee urges this

court to affirm the judgment of the district court and deny the
appeal as being spurious.
DATED this 21st day of July, 1980.
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General

~. .,~~

BRUCE M. HALE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
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